Temo che Lei conosca un altro Pannella. 

Gli ordini li da' il Quirinale, su ordini della Clinton in questo caso, sempre che i britannici o la CIA non si mettano di mezzo.

Visto dove hanno parcheggiato Pannella, gli ordini a Pannella arrivano ora tramite Bersani che, sempre che i britannici o altri non si mettano di mezzo, ha avuto ordine di salvare, ora, il governo Berlusconi. 

Programmi, obiettivi, ed altro sono fumisterie per le plebi.

In parlamento, non fanno un cazzo se non gli affari loro. Sono governati da burocrazie sciatte e procedure insensate. L'unica cosa certa sono i soldi ufficiali e quelli extra. Servono a comprare l'omerta' dei parlamentari su cosa "le istituzioni" siano davvero. Scene d'ordinaria ed incredibile corruzione materiale e morale.

L'ha vista la non risposta del governo all'interrogazione sul caso Carraro, che qualcuno ha postato anche qui? Perfino i Ministri non contano nulla. Il punto e' che chi conti non esiste. Tutto va da solo [mega crimini a parte], non si sa dove ne' perche'.

http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Paolo+Farinella&aq=f

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anche io fumavo, pur non avendo [purtoppo] una moglie che amo, ho smesso, ma sarei contento di farmi una fumata di maria autocoltivata. non andrei di certo a guidare e sono sicuro che con un'informazione seria l'antiproibizionismo salverebbe il mondo.

Questa è una vera battaglia, una battaglia che porta avanti la Claudia Sterzi per i radicali. Coltivarsi le proprie piante di maria, o nel giardino o in vaso sarebbe un colpaccio niente male ad una buona parte del narcotraffico. Belle piante, quelle di ultima generazione, quelle che dopo tre tiri sei a posto, gli occhi brillano e il sorriso cresce. Che serate , che serate, con qualche tiro di kif sotto la Koutoubia a Marrakech, una bottiglia di vin du MAROC E POI  nella piazza Jema el Fnaa, a  casa di Hassan e Mustafà. Al cinema,  allo stadio,, al mare ad Essauira. Nel mondo delle droghe leggere che ho frequentato per circa venticinque anni non ho mai assistito a violenze, a faide, a ricerca di potere.....Semmai grandi e incontenibili risate. Ho smesso perchè i bronchi non ce la facevano più, ma....e passasse la coltivazione casalinga ritornerei in auge anche io. Daltronde ci sono i vinaioli con le loro belle vigne, e niente mi vieterebbe di avere la mia uva e di farmi il mio vino e di bermelo in santissima pace fuori dall'abitacole dell'auto....Viva la Maria.

Oh, ecco, li avevo visti ieri... [ma saran ben piu' vecchi...]

Due cable complementari da Roma:

"Prodi dice che non suka, ma per noi e' ancora meglio perche', proprio perche' finge di non essere capace, suka a 360 gradi e pure di piu'. Eppoi, quello che i minchioni chiamano alternanza e' il principio chiave del sukeggio. Piu' che competono e s'alternano ce lo sukano uno piu' degli altri e cosi' via. Di mejo non se portrebb'avve'!!! Il Berluska si finge gran sukone, ma noi non ce femo inganna' troppo. Prodi&Co. se finge vergine, ma noi non vogliamo contraddirlo.La competizione per compiacerci li rende uguali. Oh, il mercato ...delle vacche italiotiche!"

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Viewing cable 08ROME1406, SCENESETTER FOR YOUR DECEMBER 3 VISIT TO ROME

VZCZCXRO4559 OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHRO #1406/01 3241033 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 191033Z NOV 08 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1186 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0440 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4475 RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE IMMEDIATE 3303 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN IMMEDIATE 9669 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES IMMEDIATE 3460 RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001406

SIPDIS

FROM THE AMBASSADOR TO THE SECRETARY

EO 12958 DECL: 11/15/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, NATO, IT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR DECEMBER 3 VISIT TO ROME

REF: A) ROME 1386 B) ROME 1320
ROME 00001406 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary. 1. (C) Summary. The political conditions in Italy are dramatically different from the conditions that existed when you last visited in July 2006. Silvio Berlusconi has returned to power after two years of a divided and ineffectual Prodi government. Berlusconi enjoys unparalleled levels of public support and his broad base of power has allowed us to make good progress in advancing our agenda, including successfully pressing for significant reductions on caveats imposed on Italian troops in Afghanistan by the previous government and approval of a major and crucial base expansion at Vicenza. During your visit, I hope you can publicly announce the establishment of AFRICOM,s Army and Navy subcomponent commands in Italy, an important symbol of the strength of our close bilateral security relationship.

¶2. (C) Our reenergized cooperation with Berlusconi, however, does not extend to all issues. Berlusconi’s close, personal relationship with Putin has translated into Italian support for nearly every Russian initiative intended to weaken transatlantic support for NATO expansion and our efforts to curb the Kremlin’s worst instincts. On Iran, after a period of Italian support for U.S. and EU efforts to resolve the nuclear issue, Italy’s policy has become unfocused and even critical of the international process. I hope you can let Berlusconi know that Italy’s renegade initiatives to soften international and transatlantic positions on Russia and Iran can only serve to create confusion and reduce collective security. On the economic front, Italy’s banks have avoided the worst of the financial meltdown, but the broader economy will suffer from the ensuing global economic slow-down. End Summary.

Domestic Politics: Berlusconi Firmly in Control
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶3. (C) Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is in an enviable position domestically, enjoying so comfortable a majority in Parliament that he can pass virtually any legislation without the support of the opposition. He used his first months back in government to deliver results on election promises, though long-term solutions to most problems are still needed. The trash problem in Naples is not yet permanently solved, but the streets are cleared and troops are keeping dumps and incinerators open. Public worries about street crime have been addressed by a sweeping new security law. A public finance law has overhauled the annual budget process, which traditionally has eaten up months of Parliament’s time, but Italy’s faltering economy casts doubt on whether budget targets will be met. Berlusconi’s government drafted and passed these laws mostly without consulting the center-left opposition, which has grown more fragmented and less effective. Most foreign policy initiatives will be directed by Berlusconi personally without the need of any legislation.

¶4. (C) Berlusconi has made a few missteps, such as his awkward attempt at a joke, in referring to President-Elect Obama as “suntanned”, and center-left contacts argue that the honeymoon period may end soon. Clearly Berlusconi’s current level of popularity is unsustainable over the long run, but predictions that the wind is changing already are premature. The center right’s first major electoral test will be the European elections in June, which will be a critical moment for the center left to evaluate whether it needs new leadership and for the center right to see if it continues to enjoy such high levels of approval from the Italian people.

Transatlantic Relationship: All Russia All the Time
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶5. (C) Berlusconi’s close personal (and, some suspect, financial) relationship with Putin has led him to champion unquestioningly every initiative the Kremlin has rolled out. Italy’s Russia policy is his personal game, one which he conducts on a tactical basis to gain the trust and favor of his Russian interlocutors. He consistently rejects the strategic advice of his demoralized, resource-starved, and increasingly irrelevant Foreign Ministry in favor of his business cronies, many of whom are deeply dug into Russia’s
ROME 00001406 002.2 OF 003
European energy strategy. As a result of his short-sighted obsession with Russia, Berlusconi has thrown his support behind Medvedev’s calls for a new security architecture in Europe to supersede NATO and OSCE, has publicly called for Ukrainian and Georgian NATO aspirations to be put on hold in deference to Russian sensitivities, has called on President-Elect Obama to withdraw support for Missile Defense, and continues to insist that Russia acted properly during the Georgia-Russia conflict. He has even called on the EU to admit Russia as a member. Most disturbingly, Berlusconi has attempted to portray himself inside the EU as the bridge between the U.S. and Russia. In practice, this has meant that the GOI has consistently worked to water down EU stances on Russia, and tried to derail U.S.-led efforts to contain Moscow’s worst instincts. His efforts to encourage greater “dialogue” have created more confusion between Russia and the transatlantic community, not less. We have pushed back forcefully on this (ref a) but you can provide a sense of realism to Berlusconi by letting him know that his efforts are working against U.S. and transatlantic efforts.

Muddying the Waters on Iran
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶6. (C) Berlusconi came into power with a tough public stance on Iran and showed himself eager to support the P5-plus-1. This initial clarity has given way to an unfocused, even critical policy with respect to building international consensus for further sanctions. FM Frattini recently questioned the efficacy of the P5 1 approach in public comments, and reached out to Iran,s nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, to invite him to Rome for consultations. Even while working within the EU framework to discuss further national measures, working-level GOI officials continue to question the efficacy of further sanctions.

Economic Crisis: Banks OK, but economy suffers
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶7. (C) Stodgy, old fashioned banking practices allowed Italy to avoid being directly hit by the global financial melt-down. Italian banks simply did not engage in the kind of sub-prime lending that got others in trouble, and Italian banks did not buy significant amounts of the toxic derivatives that are causing so much trouble around the globe. But Italy is being affected by the results of the financial crisis: Italian stock prices have plummeted, stirring fears of possible foreign buy-outs of Italian firms, and Italy’s already shaky economy will be hard-hit by the global recession that was sparked by the financial crisis. As for Italy’s preferred response to the crisis, the Italians seem to be following Sarkozy’s lead, and seem to share his enthusiasm for major reform of the international finance institutions. As is the case in many other countries, Italy is also looking at the possibility of government support for industries hurt by the recession.

¶8. (C) Italy’s Finance Minister, Giulio Tremonti, often supports protectionist, anti-globalization positions, but in the ongoing discussion of the financial crisis we expect Italy to adhere to the more moderate consensus policies hammered out by the EU.

Little Room for Expanding Presence in Afghanistan
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶9. (C) Italy is the sixth-largest contributor to ISAF with 2,200 troops, a PRT in Herat, and command of RC-West. Berlusconi has made good on his pledge to President Bush last June to remove geographic caveats and send 34 Carabinieri to train Afghan police, and he has promised to address allegations of Italian protection payments to insurgent leaders. Additionally, FM Frattini has announced his intention to host a G8 Ministerial on Afghanistan with a special focus on providing a regional solution to the Afghan-Pakistan border region. But the Italians now say that new troop deployments above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 2,300 troops will be impossible for budgetary reasons, and that its only new contribution to ISAF this fall will be in the form of four Tornado jet fighters. Italy has also been cool toward our requests to provide donor support to ANA expansion and election preparation, citing budgetary
ROME 00001406 003.4 OF 003
concerns. You should stress that Italy’s decision to reduce defense expenditures (which will put them even further below the NATO-recommended threshold of 1% of GDP) is of major concern to us, and it risks making Italy a less reliable partner in international security operations, just at a point when the need for greater contributions from partners may grow in Afghanistan.

Rolling out AFRICOM
- - - - - - - - - -

¶10. (C) Your visit will provide an opportunity to highlight our cooperation on Africa through Italy’s hosting of portions of AFRICOM. GOI officials were initially hesitant to sign off, due to concerns over how and under what circumstances U.S. forces in Italy might deploy to potential conflict zones in Africa. The GoI eventually agreed to the establishment of AFRICOM’s Army and Navy subcomponent commands in existing facilities in Italy on October 1, but asked us to delay announcing the move (ref b). The South East Europe Task Force (SETAF) in Vicenza has assumed the Army component functions and a component of NAVEUR in Naples is now fulfilling the naval functions. Italian concerns focused on SETAF and hinged on two issues -- one legal and the other local and political. The classified 1954 Bilateral Infrastructure Agreement (BIA) limits U.S. basing in Italy exclusively to troops deployed for NATO purposes. After long negotiations, the GOI accepted our broad interpretation of the BIA and the NATO SOFA as applicable to the AFRICOM subcomponents due to their role in supporting NATO Operations in Africa and their availability for other NATO missions as required. But the GOI asked for us to delay public announcement of the shift due to local controversy over the expansion of the base in Vicenza to the Dal Molin airfield.

¶11. (C) The GOI responded positively to our proposal for a joint announcement of the shift during your visit to Italy. A joint statement acknowledging the establishment of the two entities would allow us to highlight the security assistance and humanitarian aspects of AFRICOM’s mission and also divorce the issue as much as possible from base expansion controversy in Vicenza. It will also provide an opportunity to showcase the synergies between AFRICOM and the GOI’s own efforts to encourage stability in Africa and also their excellent work at training primarily African peacekeepers through its Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU), a joint U.S.-Italian G8 initiative which is also located in Vicenza.

When Will the Honeymoon End?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶12. (C) Most of our contacts within Berlusconi’s own party as well as in the center left expect this government’s honeymoon period to end in the first half of 2009, as Italians focus on the nation’s systemic problems that have no easy solution, most importantly the economy. Democratic Party officials tell us that they see the declining standard of living among the middle class as the greatest opportunity to gain strength before the European elections in June. Should the rescue efforts for Alitalia remain unresolved in the face of continued strikes or should the protests against education reform gain traction with a broader segment of the electorate, Berlusconi’s popularity will suffer.

Conclusion
- - - - - -

¶13. (C) Berlusconi’s shoot-from-the-hip style and frequent gaffes frequently create bumps in the relationship with the U.S. Nevertheless, he staunchly supports and admires the U.S. and its people. Despite its economic malaise, Italy remains a close and influential partner and will continue to be an important ally for the U.S. in NATO, the region and the world. Your visit will be an important sign of the strength and closeness of the bilateral relationship and I am delighted that you are taking the opportunity to visit Rome. SPOGLI

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Viewing cable 05ROME3585, SCENESETTER FOR PM BERLUSCONI'S OCTOBER 31 MEETING

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 003585

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV CVIS IT ITALY NATIONAL ELECTIONS ITALIAN POLITICS IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PM BERLUSCONI'S OCTOBER 31 MEETING
WITH THE PRESIDENT

Classified By: Ambassador Spogli, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d).

¶1. (C) Summary. PM Berlusconi specifically requested this
meeting, and a spring address to a joint session of Congress,
to bolster his prospects in Italy's April elections. Behind
in the polls and facing his toughest campaign, Berlusconi
will juxtapose his proactive and pro-U.S.foreign policy with
that of his likely center-left opponent, Romano Prodi, who
prefers to follow an EU foreign policy lead and has called
for a timetable to withdraw Italian troops from Iraq. GOI
officials are concerned about a potential terrorist attack,
either during the Turin Winter Olympics or the spring
elections.

¶2. (C) Berlusconi will seek: (a) presidential statements of
support on shared values; (b) support for extending in 2005
the UN mandate on Iraq; (c) tangible progress on a plan to
enhance Iraqi security capabilities and allow a coordinated
drawdown of Italian forces; and (d) the President's possible
intervention to waive or delay new passport requirements for
continued Italian participation in the Visa Waiver Program.
We should: (a) offer appropriate praise for Italy's foreign
policy support without jeopardizing our relationship with
Prodi; and (b) engage Berlusconi on Russia and Iran. End
Summary

Italian Elections
-----------------

¶3. (C) PM Silvio Berlusconi prides himself on his warm
relationship with the President and has carefully planned
this meeting and a spring address to a joint session of
Congress (he meets Speaker Hastert before going to the White
House) to bolster his prospects in Italy's national
elections, tentatively scheduled for April 9. Berlusconi's
center-right coalition is down eight points in the polls,
undermined by internal leadership spats and continued
economic stagnation. The center-left also is plagued by
internal disputes but former European Commission President
Romano Prodi just won a triumphant electoral victory in the
primaries. Pending electoral law changes may slightly
increase the odds for the center-right, and it is too early
to deal Berlusconi out. However, most political observers
predict Prodi's center-left coalition will win in April.

Iraq: Seeking a Way Forward
---------------------------

¶4. (C) We expect Berlusconi will juxtapose his proactive,
pro-U.S. foreign policy with that of Prodi, who prefers to
follow an EU foreign policy lead and has publicly called for
a timetable to withdraw Italian troops from Iraq. Berlusconi
has remained adamant that Italian troops will stay in Iraq
until the security situation warrants, and the Iraqi
government requests, a drawdown of Italian troops. The
center-right has already accused Prodi of encouraging
terrorist attacks on Italy through reckless calls for
withdrawal. However, Italian public opinion remains
overwhelmingly opposed to the war in Iraq and Berlusconi will
be under increasing pressure to make public statements about
plans to withdraw troops. He will be reassured by
commitments of continued high-level consultations but would
better appreciate progress in enhancing Iraqi security
capabilities in a way that allows measured Italian drawdowns
by April. Italy is also seeking an extension of the UN Iraq
mandate by the end of the year; the Italian presence is
premised on the UN mandate, and Parliament will vote in
January on the next six-months of funding for thier troops.
Italy also feels that the mandate extension should
specifically reference political progress in Iraq.

¶5. (C) We can and will work with a Prodi-led government
should the center-left win next year. Despite Prodi's calls
for a withdrawal timetable, other elements of his center-left
coalition have assured us that Italy will not make any
dramatic Zapatero-style actions and will coordinate changes
in troop levels with both us and the Iraqi government. Prodi
himself has hinted at a compromise formula involving
continued Italian involvement in Iraq for reconstruction
initiatives.

Strongest Ally in Continental Europe
------------------------------------

¶6. (C) Berlusconi will be seeking Presidential statements
of support on shared values for our freedom agenda and praise
for Italy's substantial commitment of resources overseas. In
addition to being the third largest contributor of troops to
MFN-I, Italy also funds reconstruction and justice projects
in Iraq, leads ISAF, a PRT and a justice initiative in
Afghanistan, just took over KFOR command, pledged $3 million
to the UN Fund for Democracy, indicated it will fund the new
Foundation for the Future, co-hosts Democracy Assistance
Dialogue initiatives with Turkey and Yemen, and provided
earthquake and hurricane relief for Pakistan and New Orleans.
We want to provide appropriate praise without jeopardizing a
potential future relationship with a center-left government.

Budget Woes
-----------
¶7. (C) High public debt, rising social welfare costs and a
stagnant economy are limiting Berlusconi's ability to
maneuver in the face of growing domestic economic discontent.
Pocketbook issues will drive the campaign and be
Berlusconi's biggest challenge, although Prodi has yet to
offer any credible alternative economic policy. The draft
budget now being debated by the Italian Parliament must be
approved by the end of the year, and it appears it will
include painful cuts in many sectors. This includes
potentially dramatic (to about .85% of GDP) cuts in the
defense budget and a 20% reduction in the overseas deployment
budget that could undermined Italy's ability to sustain its
overseas commitments.

Terrorist Threat Looms Large
----------------------------

¶8. (C) Following the London bombings, the GOI approved a
strong anti-terrorism law and began a crackdown of arrests
and deportations of illegal immigrants and suspected
terrorists. However, Italy continues to be targeted in
fundamentalist websites, and many Italian officials expect
Italy will be attacked in the near future. They are worried
specifically about a potential attack during either the
February Turin Olympics or the spring elections. We continue
to work closely with the GOI on security preparations and
intelligence sharing for the Olympics as well as on
increasing readiness for possible attacks on USG facilities
or London/Madrid scenarios.

UN Reform/Iran/Russia/Balkans
-----------------------------

¶9. (C) Berlusconi is likely to thank you for U.S. support
in opposing the G-4 plan for UNSC reform; while Italy's
specific concern is blocking Germany from obtaining a seat,
they support our view that any changes to the Security
Council should be based on a wide consensus of support within
the UN. As Iran's largest European trading partner, Italy
remains concerned that it has been excluded from the EU-3
negotiations and complains that the EU-3 has not sufficiently
consulted other EU member states. Italy shares our concern
about proliferation and supports moving the issue to the
UNSC. Overall, however, Italy favors engagement over
confrontation and will be concerned about the economic losses
associated with potential sanctions. Berlusconi and Putin
remain good friends, and Berlusconi continues to insist he
has delivered our messages of concern about Putin's
increasingly anti-democratic actions. Another nudge from the
President would strengthen our message. Italy remains fully
engaged on the Balkans and supports a continued international
presence in Bosnia and Kosovo until there is international
consensus that both entities have made sufficient progress on
democratic reforms. The candidacy of Amb. Laura Mirachian
for the post of the High Representative in Bosnia is of key
interest to the Italians. They have lobbied strongly for USG
support, arguing that Italy's high military profile deserves
an equally strong policy voice. Department and Embassy
officers who have met with Mirachian believe she shares our
outlook for the future of the region. While she has not
received official USG support at this point, the USG does not
want to be seen as opposing her candidacy, since she could
emerge as the front-runner.

Visa Waiver Program
-------------------

¶10. (SBU) DHS has confirmed that there will be no blanket
waiver, no official policy favoring parole, and no exceptions
to the October 26, 2005 requirement for digitized photos in
passports for any beneficiary of the Visa Waiver Program
(VWP). The GOI plans to issue machine readable passports
with digitized photographs in five Italian Prefectures: Rome,
Milan, Naples, Palermo and Cagliari, with the possibility of
successive extension to other Prefectures. Italians who
obtain passports after October 26 from Prefectures other than
these five offices, or who obtain passports from an Italian
Consulate abroad, will require a U.S. visa. U.S. consular
sections in Italy are working with airlines and travel
agencies to ensure that Italian passengers caught unaware of
the change in visa requirements are directed to the closest
Embassy or Consulate for expeditious visa processing.

¶11. (C) President Ciampi, FM Fini and senior aides to PM
Berlusconi have all raised the VWP issue with the Ambassador,
insisting that the new requirements will be a major
embarrassment to Berlusconi just when he is trying to use his
U.S. connections to improve his election prospects.
Berlusconi may ask the President to intervene to fix the
problem, arguing that Italy is a staunch partner in the war
on terror and is in the process of implementing previously
announced U.S. requirements for biometric passports.
SPOGLI